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5	Attorneys for Defendants/Counerclaimants	ES DISTRICT COURT
6	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA	
7		CI OF ARIZONA
8 9	FLAGSTAFF ARTS AND LEADERSHIP ACADEMY,	No. 3:13-CV-08171-PCT-HRH
10	Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,	ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM FO
11	VS.	ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES UNDER THE IDEA
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13	E.S., a Student by and through Parent, MICHELLE GRUA	(BEFORE THE HONORABLE H. RUSSELL HOLLAND)
<ul><li>14</li><li>15</li></ul>	Defendants/Counterclaimants.	
16 17	For their Answer to Plaintiff's Co.	mplaint, Defendants E.S., a Student by and
18	through Parent Michelle Grua, herby admits, denies and affirmatively allege as follows:	
19	1. Defendants deny every allegation of	the Complaint not specifically admitted in
20	this Answer.	
<ul><li>21</li><li>22</li></ul>	2. Paragraphs 1 through 4 state legal co	nclusions to which no response is
23	necessary. To the extent the Court requires a	response, Defendants admit jurisdiction and
24	venue are proper in this court, and Defendants	s acknowledge Plaintiff filed a Motion for
<ul><li>25</li><li>26</li></ul>	Injunctive Relief, but denies it has merit.	
27	3. Defendants admit the allegations in p	aragraph 5.
28	4. Answering paragraph 6, Defendants	admit E.S. is a minor child whose residence

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is with Parent, Michelle Grua, and that Student is a child with disability entitled to services under the IDEA. The remaining allegations of paragraph 6 are denied. FALA apparently disenrolled, or attempted to disenroll, Student.

- 5. Answering paragraph 7, Defendants admit that FALA met with Parent and that FALA offered an IEP in January 2012 and an IEP in June 2012, but Defendants deny that either of the IEP's were properly developed to provide Student with a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE"). Defendants deny there was an IEP offered in May 2012. Defendants affirmatively allege an IEP was offered in June 2012 for the following school year at FALA; the IEP designated FALA as the home school and as the attending school. Defendants affirmatively assert that the Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH"), through the Honorable Eric A. Bryant, specifically found, as a matter of fact, that FALA violated the IDEA's substantive mandate. Judge Bryant held that "the January 2012 IEP was inadequate to offer Student educational benefit because it did not address all of her needs or areas of disability. It failed to provide goals to properly address basic reading, reading fluency, life skills, and other areas of need. As such, it did not offer a FAPE to Student." Judge Bryant further held that the June 2012 IEP also "was not calculated to provide Student educational benefit" in that it too "still did adequately address all areas and did not provide enough specificity to show that it would provide educational benefit to Student."
- 6. Answering paragraph 8, Defendants deny Parent enrolled Student at Maple Lake Academy after rejecting the IEP. Defendants affirmatively alleges that Parent placed Student at Maple Lake Academy after the failure of the January 2012 IEP. Thus, as a

result of FALA's substantive violations of the IDEA, Parent exercised her legal right to unilaterally place Student at Maple Lake Academy ("MLA"), a private residential school approved by the Department of Education of the State of Utah to provide special education to students with the same severe disabilities as Student, and that Parent appropriately sought reimbursement at public expense through the meritorious due process complaint that was filed. Judge Bryant, for reasons more fully explained in his decision, emphasized that "the placement at FALA was not appropriate for Student" and that the "evidence shows that Student needed, and still needs, an intensive program like MLA."

- 7. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraphs 9 and 10, except that Defendants filed the Due Process Complaint July 26, 2012.
- 8. Answering paragraph 11, Defendants admit that Administrative Law Judge Bryant issued a thorough and reasoned decision granting all the substantive relief requested in the Due Process Complaint. Defendants admit that the decision of Judge Bryant is attached to the Plaintiff's Complaint and asserts that the decision speaks for itself. Defendants admit that Judge Bryant concluded that FALA failed to provide Student a FAPE, failed to offer a FAPE, and that FALA is not an appropriate placement for Student. Defendants affirmatively assert that Judge Bryant found that "the January 2012 IEP was inadequate to offer Student educational benefit" and that the June 2012 IEP also "was not calculated to provide Student educational benefit."
- 9. Answering paragraph 12, Defendants deny the allegation that the findings and decision of the ALJ were erroneous and Defendants further denys the allegation that the

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ALJ improperly granted relief to Defendant. Defendants further deny each and every one of the allegations in paragraph 12 (i) – (xi) and affirmatively asserts that Judge Bryant's decision is thorough and well-reasoned, that his factual conclusions and his legal conclusions were correct. Specifically, Defendants assert:

- (i.) Judge Bryant did not improperly delegate authority to an IEP team to determine how long E.S. should remain at Maple Lake Academy. He properly concluded, based on the evidence, that Maple Lake Academy is the appropriate placement for Student, and that Student should remain at Maple Lake Academy for 18 to 24 months and until her FALA IEP team determines that another placement is appropriate. He properly ruled that after the 18 to 24 months, it is for the IEP team to determine if another placement is appropriate or if Student should remain at Maple Lake Academy. Judge Bryant properly ruled that 18 to 24 months is the minimum Student should remain at Maple Lake Academy based on the testimony of the psychologist from Maple Lake Academy that its students typically, on average, stay 18 months with many students staying two years, as that is the time it takes to prepare the students to function independently in a less restrictive environment. FALA presented no contrary evidence.
- (ii.) Judge Bryant did not "exceed his authority as a matter of law" by improperly designating FALA as the responsible School to provide Student services. FALA was and remains the Student's Public Educational Agency.

Student was enrolled at FALA in January 2012 when the initial IEP was created that denied FAPE, and Student was enrolled at FALA in May 2012 and June 2012 when the IEP team met to create the IEP for the following school year, wherein IEP designated FALA as the location and placement of services. The FALA members of the IEP team determined to place Student at FALA continuing with the 2012-2013 school year. Parent never withdrew or un-enrolled Student. Rather, FALA claims that Student was no longer its student after Parent filed her Due Process Complaint.

- (iii.) Judge Bryant properly determined as a matter of fact that FALA did not provide Student a FAPE and would not provide Student a FAPE. This conclusion was supported by the record and is not clearly erroneous.
- (iv.) Judge Bryant properly concluded, as a matter of fact, based on substantial evidence, that the January 2012 IEP created by the IEP team "was inadequate to offer Student educational benefit because it did not address all of her needs or areas of disability. It failed to provide goals to properly address basic reading, reading fluency, life skills, and other areas of need. As such, it did not offer a FAPE to Student." Judge Bryant also found that the June 2012 IEP as created by the IEP team did not offer Student a FAPE because "it still did adequately address all areas and did not provide enough specificity to show that it would provide educational benefit to Student. Most notably, the placement at FALA was not appropriate for Student [and that the] placement decision in the June 2012 IEP was, thus, a substantive

violation of the IDEA and denied Student a FAPE." Judge Bryant also expressed that "The evidence shows that Student needs an intensive program of behavioral support in order to receive educational benefit [and thus] the June 2012 IEP did not offer Student a FAPE. These conclusions were supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous.

- (v.) Judge Bryant did not express that he was awarding compensatory education. To the extent the award was compensatory in nature, Judge Bryant was nevertheless not required to set out and label the number of hours of compensatory education. Compensatory education services are awarded as equitable relief.<sup>1</sup> Courts have discretion on how to craft the relief and there is no obligation to provide an hour-for-hour or day-for-day compensation for services that were denied.<sup>2</sup> Judge Bryant's decision sets forth the basis for the reimbursement.
- (vi.) Judge Bryant did not err as a matter of law by failing to address whether MLA is the least restrictive environment (LRE) at which Student can be educated. LRE is not a consideration when analyzing the appropriateness of a parentally chosen placement.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii) ("shall grant such relief as the court determines appropriate"); *Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist.*, 31 F.3d 1489, 1496–97 (9th Cir.1994).

<sup>2</sup> Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 31 F.3d at 1497 (9th Cir.1994).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Cleveland Heights-University City Sch. Dist. v. Boss, 144 F.3d 391, 399 (6th Cir. 1998)(at n7); Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist. 238 F. 2d 755, 770 (6th Cir. 2001); accord Warren G. v. Cumberland County Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, (3d Cir. 1999). See also Board of Educ. V. Illinois State Bd. Of Education, 41 F. 3d 1162,

/11.)	Judge Bryant considered all relevant evidence, expressly stating in his
	decision that he "read and considered each admitted Exhibit, even if not
	mentioned in this Decision [and] also considered the testimony of every
	witness, even if the witness is not specifically mentioned in this Decision."
	There was no evidence presented that Parent interfered with the "IDEA
	process," although FALA claimed that Parent withheld pages from a
	neuropsychological report, which Judge Bryant addressed specifically
	stating that he "reviewed the written evaluation and [found] that the
	absence of those pages did not significantly restrict FALA's ability to
	assess Student's needs." Judge Bryant properly considered all relevant
	evidence of Student's educational performance and performance at school,
	and acknowledged and considered Student's educational needs. FALA
	alleges that Judge Bryant "failed to properly consider the impact of
	[Student's] conduct outside of the educational environment." That
	allegation suggests schools can excuse their failure to offer FAPE for some
	students.

(viii.) The allegation is non-sensical. Parent offers the following Answer to address FALA's allegation that that Judge Bryant improperly weighed

1168 (7th Cir. 1994), cited with approval in Seattle School Dist. No. 1v. B.S., 82 F. 3d 1493, 1502 (9th Cir. 1996) (where school district failed to propose a satisfactory alternative, court was not required to locate another school that would satisfy the least restrictive requirement based on the entire pool of schools available, but rather was required simply to determine whether that one available choice would provide an appropriate education).

testimony. It is important to note that FALA improperly labels Student's neuropsychologist as Parent's expert witness, that the neuropsychologist, Dr. Amy Serin, evaluated Student and FALA adopted Dr. Serin's evaluation. FALA subsequently requested Dr. Serin conduct additional testing for FALA. FALA offered no evidence to contradict Dr. Serin's testimony. Dr. Serin's diagnostic impressions were supported by a full and complete evaluation, including a battery of tests. The weight Judge Bryant gave the testimony of Dr. Serin was not clearly erroneous. Beyond FALA's complaint about the weight Judge Bryant gave Dr. Serin, this allegation is so vague and ambiguous that Defendants cannot reasonably prepare a response.

- (ix.) FALA was and remains the Student's Public Educational Agency. The FALA members of the IEP team determined to place Student at FALA continuing with the 2012-2013 school year. Parent never withdrew or unenrolled Student. Rather, FALA claims that Student was no longer its student after Parent filed her Due Process Complaint.
- (x.) FALA was and remains the Student's Public Educational Agency. The FALA members of the IEP team determined to place Student at FALA continuing with the 2012-2013 school year. Parent never withdrew or unenrolled Student.
- (xi.) Judge Bryant clearly set out and identified the associated expenses to date, citing to the Exhibits (documentary evidence) submitted by Parent in

support of her request for associated expenses.

With respect to the Complaint's prayer for relief, Defendants specifically assert that FALA is not entitled to any relief and that FALA's request for fees and costs is without any legal basis under the IDEA and is interposed for an improper purpose, specifically intimidation. The request for fees is not made in good faith; it is not warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying or reversing existing law or for establishing new law. As such, Plaintiff's request for fees violates Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and should be subject to sanctions.

WHEREFORE, having answered Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendants pray that Plaintiff takes nothing thereby and the Court enter judgment against Plaintiff dismissing Plaintiff's action in its entirety with prejudice and awarding Defendants their reasonable fees and costs (including attorneys' fees and expenses under the IDEA) as provided by law and all other relief as the Court deems just and proper, including under Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to Plaintiff's improper claim for attorneys' fees in this matter.

## **COUNTERCLAIM**

Counter-claimants, E.S., a minor, by and through her parent, Michelle Grua, brings this counterclaim to establish that counterclaimants are the prevailing parties and entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs in connection with the underlying administrative hearing. The administrative hearing was brought pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §1415 (i)(3)(B) of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

Counterclaimant is seeking fees and costs (taxable and non-taxable) incurred to compel Flagstaff Arts & Leadership Academy District (Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant) (hereinafter "FALA") to comply with the requirements of the IDEA and pursue this cause of action.

- 1. This Court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 in that it arises under 20 U.S.C. §1415 (i)(3)(B) of the Individuals Disability Education Act ("IDEA").
- Jurisdiction is vested in this Court under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(A). Venue in the Court is also proper under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)
- 3. Counterclaimant is a minor student whose residence is with her parent, Michelle Grua. At all times material hereto, E.S. ("Student") was a student with disabilities and eligible for special education and related services under the IDEA.
- 4. FALA is a charter school district duly organized and existing under the laws of the state of Arizona and, at all times material hereto, was the Public Education Agency responsible for providing a Free and Appropriate Public Education ("FAPE") for Student.
- 5. On July 26, 2012, Parent filed a due process complaint on Student's behalf with the Arizona Department of Education. The case was assigned to the Honorable Eric A. Bryant, Administrative Law Judge and given the case number 13C-DP-005-ADE. Over the course of three days, Judge Bryant heard testimony, received exhibits and issued a comprehensive, detailed and well-reasoned decision on June 15, 2013. In the decision, Judge Bryant ordered the substantive relief requested by the Parent. A copy of the decision was attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Complaint and is a matter of record. Defendants request that the Court take official / judicial notice of the decision.

- 6. Counterclaimants are the prevailing party pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §1415 (i)(3)(B) and is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs (taxable and non-taxable) in the administrative proceedings, plus such additional fees and costs as may be incurred to present this complaint for fees. *Barlow-Gresham Union High School District No. 2 v. Mitchell*, 940 F. 2d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1991.
- 7. Counterclaimants retained counsel to pursue and vindicate Student's rights under the IDEA. Attorneys' fees will be sought based upon the number of hours reasonably expended to pursue student's federally protected rights multiplied by the prevailing market rates in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation comparable to those of Counterclaimant's counsel in the administrative hearing as well as counsel in this court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C); *Blum v. Stenson*, 465 U.S. 886, 895-6 n. 11 (1984); *Hensley v. Eckerhart*, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).
- 8. Counterclaimants will seek reasonable rates based on current, rather than historic, hourly rates for attorneys. *Missouri v. Jenkins*, 491 U.S. 274, 284 (1989). Counterclaimant will submit appropriate documentation and affidavits to support the claim for fees and costs in this case.
- 7. Counterclaimants are requesting interest as a matter of law from the time judgment for fees and costs is entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§1961.

## **Prayer for Relief**

**WHEREFORE**, Counterclaimants demand judgment against Flagstaff Arts & Leadership Academy and prays for the following relief:

1	A. An Order declaring Counterclaimants as the prevailing party;	
2	B. Judgment for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs (taxable and non-taxable)	
3	incurred in the administrative proceedings, and for pursuing this complaint for	
4	fees and costs in this court, which amounts will be established by motion filed	
5	pursuant to the local rules of procedure for the District Court;	
6	C. Interest on the Judgment at the highest lawful rate and from the earliest lawful	
7	date until paid; and	
8 9	D. For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.	
10	DECDECTER LA CLIMPITEED LA 22 2012	
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12	KIRSCH-GOODWIN & KIRSCH, PLLC By: /s/ <b>Hope N. Kirsch</b>	
13	Hope N. Kirsch	
14	Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants	
15	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
16	I hereby certify that on July 23, 2013, I electronically transmitted the attached	
17 18	document to the Clerk's Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and transmittal of a	
19	Kenneth H. Brendel	
20		
21	PO Box 10 Flagstaff, AZ 86002-0010 (928) 773-6951	
22	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
23	By: /s/ Hope N. Kirsch	
24	A courtesy copy with a copy of the Notice of Electronic filing is also being mailed to	
25	A courtesy copy with a copy of the Notice of Electronic filing is also being mailed to HONORABLE H. RUSSELL HOLLAND on this same date at the following address:	
26	HONORABLE H. RUSSELL HOLLAND United States District Court	
27	District of Alaska 222 West 7th Avenue, #4	
28	Anchorage, AK 99513	