Consistent with its obligation
under the IDEA, the District prepared an Individual Educational Program
("IEP") setting forth ways to address Sommer's speech and language
problems. Mr. and Mrs. Boss approved this IEP and it was implemented.
The following year, when
Sommer was in first grade, another IEP was prepared by the school
and approved by Sommer's parents and she continued her speech and
language therapy. That same year, Sommer was also placed in a federally-funded
reading program called Chapter I, which is not considered special
education and was not required by the IEP developed to address her
speech and language problems. At the end of her first grade year,
Sommer took the Iowa Basic Skills Test and scored in the 15th percentile
for reading and the 33rd percentile overall. Sommer's Chapter I progress
report for the first grade indicated that her word recognition, reading
comprehension, and total reading had improved slightly; that her vocabulary
had regressed and that overall she was working at a mid-kindergarten
level. Nevertheless, Sommer received "satisfactory pluses" for reading
on her report card.
The next year, when Sommer
was in the second grade, another IEP was developed for her speech
and language problems and approved by Mr. and Mrs. Boss. Sommer also
continued in the Chapter I program. During her second grade year,
Sommer began to get frustrated with school. Her Iowa Test scores declined
from the previous year. Sommer's scores placed her in the 21st percentile
overall and the 8thpercentile in reading. According to Sommer's Chapter
1 reports, she had made modest improvements and her total reading
ability was now at an early second grade level, but her reading comprehension
was still at a mid-first grade level. On her report card, Sommer received
marks indicating that her performance in reading was somewhere between
minimal and satisfactory. Concerned about Sommer's test scores and
her attitude towards school, Mrs. Boss met with Sommer's second grade
teacher and her Chapter I teacher. The teachers recommended that Sommer
work with a private tutor over the summer and that the Bosses wait
until the following year before deciding whether to have Sommer tested
for a learning disability beyond the problem identified with her speech
and language.
Throughout the summer between
her second and third grade years, Sommer worked with a private tutor.
By the time Sommer's third grade year began, the District had developed,
and her parents had approved, another IEP to address remaining speech
and articulation problems Sommer had. Sommer also resumed participation
in the Chapter I program. During third grade, Sommer was overwhelmed
by the workload and had to take a great deal of work home because
she could not complete it during assigned school periods. At the request
of Sommer's parents, her teacher reduced her workload. Sommer's Iowa
Test scores for her third grade year showed that she was continuing
to fall behind her peers. Her overall composite score placed her in
the 6th percentile and her reading ranked in the 5th percentile. Her
Chapter I reports indicated that her vocabulary and total reading
ability had regressed to a mid-first grade level. Despite these indicators,
Sommer received a grade of "satisfactory" for reading on her third
grade report card.
Sommer's parents were alarmed
by the decline in her scores and Mrs. Boss met with Sommer's third
grade teacher and her principal, Mrs. Moore, to discuss the possibility
of home schooling. Mrs. Boss also indicated that she wanted Sommer
tested for a learning disability. Mrs. Moore responded by filing a
Pupil Services Referral Form. In response to the referral form, a
Pupil Services Team consisting of Sommer's third grade teacher, speech
pathologist, and reading teacher as well as a school counselor and
the school psychologist met with the Bosses to develop an "action
plan." The "action plan" called for Sommer to have private tutoring
throughout the summer before her fourth grade year, enroll in a reading
program at the library and also stated that her progress would be
monitored throughout her fourth grade year. The Pupil Services Team
also gave the Bosses materials on Attention Deficit Disorder.
The District did not get
around to testing Sommer for a learning disability before the end
of her third grade school year. Without testing by the District, and
a finding that she was learning disabled, Sommer could not be admitted
to special education programs to address her reading problems. Over
the summer, Mr. and Mrs. Boss had Sommer undergo private testing.
This testing did not state that Sommer was learning disabled, but
did state that she should continue in the Chapter I program and that
she was "a very holistic learner and require[d] . . . multi- sensory"
instruction. Sommer's summer tutor, a learning disabilities teacher
from a neighboring school district, advised Mr. and Mrs. Boss that
Sommer would not catch up to her peers unless she was admitted to
special education programs at her present school or sent to a school
that focused on her need for intensive instruction.
Over the summer, Mr. and
Mrs. Boss researched private schools in the area catering to students
with Sommer's need for individualized instruction. In August, Mr.
and Mrs. Boss filed an enrollment application and paid a fee to reserve
a place for Sommer at the Lawrence School, which was recommended by
Sommer's summer tutor. The Bosses then requested a waiver from the
District that would permit Sommer to receive special education even
though she had not yet been tested and determined to have a learning
disability. The District was unable to act on the request for a waiver
before school started at the Lawrence School, so the Bosses decided
to send Sommer to Lawrence for the 1993-94 school year.
In September 1993, the District
informed the Bosses that Sommer could still undergo a multi-factored
examination ("MFE") to determine whether she had a disability, despite
the fact that she was now going to the Lawrence School. The Bosses
had Sommer take the MFE. It indicated that she had a specific learning
disability. Because Sommer was committed to attending Lawrence for
the 1993-94 school year, the Bosses consented to postpone until May
1994 the development of an IEP to address Sommer's reading disability
for the following school year.
In early May 1994, Mrs.
Boss and Sommer's teacher from Lawrence met with District personnel
for what they believed was to be a meeting to develop an IEP for Sommer
for the following school year. The meeting, however, degenerated into
an argument about whether the District had any obligation to develop
an IEP for Sommer before the Bosses decided whether Sommer would remain
at the Lawrence School for the 1994-95 year or re-enroll in the District.
After the District realized that it was obligated under federal law
to develop an IEP for Sommer even though she was attending Lawrence,
a second meeting was convened on June 2, 1994 to discuss an IEP for
Sommer.
Following this meeting,
an IEP was sent to the Bosses but they refused to approve it because
it provided no objective way to measure Sommer's progress,1 it did
not adequately explain the specific services she would receive during
the 50% of the school day when she was in a normal classroom setting,
and it had her attending a school with a high student-teacher ratio.
The District and theBosses agreed that Sommer should attend another
school in the District with a lower student-teacher ratio. However,
the dispute over the method for measuring Sommer's progress and other
issues regarding the IEP were never resolved and Mr. and Mrs. Boss
re-enrolled Sommer at the Lawrence School for the 1994-95 school year.2
A. The Ruling of the
Independent Hearing Officer
The Independent Hearing
Officer ("IHO") determined that the District failed to provide Sommer
with a Free Appropriate Public Education ("FAPE"), as required by
the IDEA. The IHO further found that the District improperly "ignored
indications" of Sommer's learning disability related to reading. Moreover,
the IEP the District sent to Sommer's parents before the 1994-95 school
year was deemed inadequate under the IDEA. The IHO also determined
that the private placement the Bosses selected for Sommer at the Lawrence
School was appropriate under the IDEA. Because the District had violated
the IDEA by failing timely to identify Sommer's reading disability
and by providing an inadequate IEP once the disability was identified,
the District was ordered to reimburse the Bosses for expenses related
toSommers's attendance at Lawrence for both the 1993-94 and 1994-95
school years.
B. The Ruling of the
State Level Review Officer
The District appealed the
IHO's ruling to the State Level Review Officer ("SLRO"). In reviewing
the IHO's ruling, the SLRO made several combined findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The SLRO determined that the District had
no reason to believe Sommer might have a learning disability handicap
related to reading because she was making progress in the Chapter
I program each year and displayed no "severe discrepancy between her
achievements and her ability." According to the SLRO, Sommer's declining
Iowa Test scores were "just one factor and [as] such not dispositive
of [her] progress or lack thereof." The SLRO also found that the District
afforded Sommer and her parents all of the rights to which they were
entitled, but that the IEP the District developed for the 1994-95
was inadequate and that the District refused to consider "altering
the proposed IEP until November 1994."
Since the proposed IEP was
inadequate, the SLRO concluded that the District had failed to provide
Sommer with a FAPE for the 1994-95 school year and her parents decision
to place her at the Lawrence School for that year was appropriate.
Pursuant to these findings, in a ruling issued on September 27, 1995,
the SLRO upheld the IHO's order that the District reimburse the Bosses
for the 1994- 95 school year, but reversed the IHO's order that the
District reimburse the Bosses for the 1993-94 school year.
C. The Ruling of the
District Court
On October 17, 1995, the
District filed an action in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, challenging the SLRO's ruling as to the
1994-95 school year. On December 19, 1995, the Bosses filed a cross-appeal
challenging the SLRO's ruling as to the 1993-94 school year. The District
moved to dismiss the Bosses' cross-appeal as untimely. The district
court denied the District's motion to dismiss the cross-appeal. The
Bosses then filed a motion for summary judgment to reverse the SLRO's
denial of reimbursement for the 1993-94 school year and a motion for
summary judgment to affirm the SLRO's award of reimbursement for the
1994-95 school year. The District filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, seeking to uphold the SLRO's ruling as to the 1993-94 school
year and to reverse the SLRO's ruling as to the 1994-95 school year.
As to the 1993-94 school year, the district court granted the District's
motion to affirm the SLRO's ruling denying reimbursement and denied
the Bosses' motion to reverse it. The district court did, however,
grant the Bosses' motion to uphold the part of the SLRO's ruling requiring
reimbursement for the 1994-95 school year and denied the District's
motion to reverse it.
III
The Bosses filed a timely
appeal to this court challenging the district court's grant of summary
judgment affirming the SLRO's denial of reimbursement for the 1993-94
school year. The District also filed a timely appeal to this court
challenging the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss
as time-barred the Bosses' cross- appeal challenging the SLRO's ruling
as to the 1993-94 school year and the district court's grant of summary
judgment upholding the SLRO's ruling regarding 1994-95 school year.
A. The Bosses' Cross-Appeal
Relating to the 1993-94 School Year
is Time-Barred
Below, the District argued
that the Bosses' cross-appeal challenging the SLRO's denial of reimbursement
for the 1993-94 school year was time-barred because it was filed seventy-eight
days after the SLRO's ruling and under Ohio Revised Code section 3323.05(F)3
it had to be filed withinforty-five days. Before, the district court,
the Bosses argued that under this court's decision in Janzen v.
Knox Cty. Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1986), O.R.C. §3323.05(F)
is not the statute of limitations applicable to their cross- appeal.
The district court agreed with the Bosses.4 We, however, do
not.
We review de novo the district
court's determination of the applicable statute of limitations. Sierra
Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 630 (6th Cir. 1997). In Janzen,
790 F.2d at 486, we recognized that the IDEA, like 42 U.S.C. §1983,
provides no statute of limitations for actions brought under it. Consistent
with the approach used to determine the statute of limitations for
actions brought under section 1983, in Janzen we sought to
determine what Tennessee statute of limitations was most appropriate
to apply to actions pursuant to the Education of All Handicapped Children
Act "EAHCA" (subsequently renamed the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, or "IDEA"). Id. at 485-86.
In Janzen, however,
we realized that the analogy to section 1983 was inapposite. The court
could not determine one state statute of limitations applicable to
all actions brought under the IDEA, as the Supreme Court had done
for section 1983 actions in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261
(1985). Id. at 487. This is because, whereas actions brought under
section 1983 are always most analogous to some type of state tort
action, there is no one state law cause of action that neatly encompasses
the various actions that can be brought under theIDEA, which range
from actions for reimbursement for a private placement to challenges
to the propriety of an IEP. Ibid. Since no one cause of action
is analogous to all of the variety of suits that can be brought under
the Act, we held in Janzen that it was inappropriate to apply
a state's statute of limitations for one specific cause of action
to every case brought under the IDEA. Therefore, we held that the
state statute of limitations applicable to actions under the IDEA
had to be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the nature
of the action, as well as the facts, circumstances, and procedural
posture of the case. Ibid. After stating this broad proposition
in Janzen, our court proceeded to determine the state statute
of limitations applicable to that case.
Janzen was not an
appeal from an administrative ruling. Id. at 486. Rather, it
was an original action under the IDEA filed in federal district court
by parents seeking reimbursement from a Tennessee public school district
for the cost of private school for their handicapped son. Id.
at 485. We considered five Tennessee statutes of limitations that
could be applied to the action. Id. at 487. The sixty-day limitations
period for appeals from rulings from any state administrative agency
was rejected because the case was an original action and the plaintiffs
"had no ruling of any kind from which to appeal." Ibid. It
was also unacceptable because it provided a more deferential standard
of review than that mandated by the IDEA. Ibid. We eventually
decided that under Tennessee law the best statute of limitations to
apply to the plaintiffs' original action for reimbursement was the
three-year limitations period provided for property tort actions because
it "applies to actions for money owed for personal services rendered"
and the plaintiffs' reimbursement claim was "in the nature of a claim
for subrogation for personal services rendered."5 Id. at 489.
The present case is different
from Janzen in two decisive ways. First, it is an appeal from
an administrative appeal, not an original action. Furthermore, this
case arose in Ohio, and Ohio has a statute of limitations-O.R.C. §3323.05(F)-specifically
for appeals from SLROs in actions under the IDEA and Ohio's parallel
law. See Cremeans v. Fairland Local Sch. Dist., 633 N.E.2d
570, 576 (1993). Furthermore, unlike the statute in Janzen pertaining
to appeals of any administrative rulings, O.R.C. §3323.05(F)
provides for the same standard of review mandated by the IDEA. See ibid. We also note that other circuits have applied similar
education-specific state statutes of limitations to appeals from state
administrative rulings on IDEA claims. See, e.g., Livingston Sch.
Dist. v. Keenan, 82 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying Montana's
30-day limitation period); Dell v. Board of Educ., 32 F.3d
1053, 1060 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Illinois's statute).6
We see no reason not to
follow suit in this case and apply O.R.C. §3323.05's forty-five
day limitations period. Because the Bosses' cross-appeal of the SLRO's
ruling regarding the 1993-94 school year was filed in the district
court seventy-eight days after the decision was issued, it was indeed
untimely. Therefore, the district court did not, and we do not, have
jurisdiction to review the SLRO's ruling denying the Bosses reimbursement
for the 1993-94 school year.
B. Reimbursement for
the 1994-95 School Year was Appropriate
This court reviews a district
court's review of an administrative ruling in an IDEA case under a
"modified de novo" standard. Doe v. Metropolitan Nashville Public
Sch., 133 F.3d 384, 386 (6th Cir. 1998). Consistent with the Supreme
Court's guidance in Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
206 (1982), we have interpreted this standard to require that courts
give "due weight to the state administrative proceedings in reaching
[their] decision." Doe, 133 F.3d at 386.
The IDEA requires the District
to provide handicapped children, such as Sommer, with a free appropriate
public education ("FAPE"). Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181 (1982).
To this end, the Act requires that for each disabled student the District
develop a curriculum "tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped
child by means of an `individualized educational program'" ("IEP"). Id. at 181-82. These IEPs must comply with certain requirements
enumerated in the IDEA and accompanying federal regulations. See id.
at 182. In this case, two state administrative review officers and
the district court concluded that the IEP that the District developed
for Sommer for the 1994-95 school year did not comply with the applicable
standards. The District makes three arguments as to why it should
not be held liable for reimbursement on the basis of any perceived
deficiencies in the IEP that it sent the Bosses in the summer of 1994.
1. The "First Draft"
Argument
The District's first argument
is that the IEP it sent to the Bosses was just a first draft -- a
starting point-that would have been further developed and refined
before the 1994-95 school year began if the Bosses had continued the
dialogue with the District over the summer. The District is correct
that under 34 C.F.R. §300.342(a) it was not required to have
an adequate IEP in place for Sommer until the "beginning of . . .
the [1994-95] school year." This argument fails, however, because,
as we pointed out in footnote 2, the administrative review officers
found that the District told the Bosses that it had no intention of
amending the IEP until November 1994-well after the school year began.
Although this was a hotly contested issue, our review of the record
does not persuade us that we should disturb this finding.
The District's attempt to
analogize this case to Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d 1186, 1188
(6th Cir. 1990) can also be dismissed quickly. In Defendant I,
the school district did not have an adequate IEP in place for the
handicapped student at the beginning of the school year because the
student's parents asked the school to wait until November to develop
an IEP so their child would have an opportunity to adjust to the new
experience of middle school "on his own." Id. at 1189. Naturally,
the court in Defendant I did not permit the parents to use
the fact that the District complied with their wishes as a sword in
their IDEA action. In the instant case, however, Sommer's parents
did not ask the District to delay preparation of an IEP until after
the school year started. Rather, it was the District that indicated
it would not take further steps until after the school year started.
2. The Minor Technicality
Argument
The District's second argument
on appeal is that any shortcomings that may have existed in the IEP
they provided the Bosses in the summer of 1994 implicated only a few
minor technical matters on a "laundry list" of requirements that were
insufficient in number and significance to constitute violations of
the IDEA warranting the award of reimbursement to the Bosses. The
IDEA provides that an IEP must include:
(A) a statement of the present
levels of educational performance of such child,
(B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional
objectives,
(C) a statement of the specific regular educational services to be
provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be
able to participate in regular educational programs, . . .
. . . .
(E) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of
such services, and
(F) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules
for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional
objectives are being achieved. 20 U.S.C. §1401(19).
The items in section 1401(19)
are requirements by which the adequacy of an IEP is to be judged,
although minor technical violations may be excused. Defendant I,
898 F.2d at 1190-91 (explaining Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176 (1982)).
The state administrative
officers and the district court all found that the IEP the District
offered the Bosses did not provide appropriate objective criteria
for measuring Sommer's progress as required by 20 U.S.C. §1401(19)(F).
We find this conclusion amply supported by the record and find no
basis for reversing it, especially under the due weight standard of
review we are required to apply, which militates against second guessing
the educational expertise of the administrative officers and conclusions
predicated upon these expertise. Doe, 133 F.3d at 386. Moreover,
this case is not like Defendant I, where we held that predicating
liability on a technical violation of the IDEA stemming from the omission
from the IEP of a statement of the student's present level of educational
performance was improper because it would "exalt form over substance."
Defendant I, 898 F.2d at 1191. Our ruling in Defendant I,
relied upon the undisputed fact that "the information absent from
the IEP was known to all parties." Id. at 1190- 91.
In this case the violation
was far from technical, and its absence was not harmless. The omission
went to the heart of the substance of the plan, and thus any analogy
to Defendant I fails.
3. The Mainstreaming
Argument
The District's final argument
begins by correctly noting that a finding that the District violated
IDEA is necessary but not sufficient to entitle the Bosses to reimbursement
for Sommer's tuition at the Lawrence School. The Bosses must also
establish that the placement of Sommer at Lawrence was "proper under
the Act [IDEA]." Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510
U.S. 7, 15 (1993).
It is undisputed that the
Lawrence School admits only learning- disabled children. Noting this
fact, the District contends that the placement of Sommer was not proper
under the IDEA because the Lawrence School cannot satisfy the IDEA's
mainstreaming requirement, which mandates:
[T]o the maximum extent
appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public
or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with
children who are not disabled, and that special classes, separate
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the
regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity
of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the
use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
20 U.S.C. §1412(5)(B).
The District's argument
actually relies upon two related propositions. First, that the mainstreaming
requirement applies to parentally selected private placements, and
second that the failure of a parentally selected private placement
to satisfy the requirement bars reimbursement under the IDEA for the
costs of sending a child to the non-complying school. The District's
reliance on Gillette v. Fairland Bd. of Educ., 932 F.2d 551(6th
Cir. 1991) is misplaced because it does not address either of these
issues. In that case, the child's IEP, which was deemed adequate,
required that he have certain courses in an environment where he would
not be with any non-disabled children. Id. at 554. The parents
removed the child from the public school, however, and placed him
in a private school that admitted only disabled students and then
sought reimbursement from the school district on the basis that their
public school was not providing a fully mainstreamed program for their
child. We rejected the parents' argument that the school district
was required to provide a fully mainstreamed environment, explaining
that the IDEA requires only that the school district provide an environment
that allows the child to participate"as much as possible in the same
activities as non-handicapped children." Id. at 554.
Gillette therefore
rejected the perverse proposition that the IDEA could be interpreted
to place the school district in the impossible position of having
to comply with an IEP requiring some of the child's education in a
non- mainstreamed environment while permitting the parents to place
the child in a private school and claim reimbursement based on the
school's compliance with IEP's mandate for some non-mainstreamed instruction.
No court has yet decided
whether the IDEA's mainstreaming requirement can be used to bar reimbursement.
However, the Supreme Court has provided guidance in resolving this
issue of first impression in two cases that rejected similar arguments
that the failure of a parentally selected private placement to comply
with provisions of the IDEA bars reimbursement. In Burlington v.
Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 372-74 (1985), the Court held
that when the school district failed to provide a FAPE, the fact that
the parents violated the IDEA's "stay put" provision by removing the
child from the public school did not bar them from being reimbursed
for the private placement they selected for their child. The Court
reasoned that barring reimbursement on this basis would create an
anomaloussituation where "the parents are forced to leave the child
in what may turn out to be an inappropriate educational placement
or to obtain the appropriate educational placement only by sacrificing
any claim for reimbursement." Id. at 372.
Similarly, in Florence,
the Court refused to bar reimbursement because the private placement
the parents selected did not comply with the requirements for a FAPE
under section 1401(18) of the IDEA in that it did not meet all of
the education standards mandated for public schools. 510 U.S. at 13-14.
The Court reasoned that imposing such requirements on private placements
would "eliminate the right of unilateral withdrawal recognized in Burlington." Ibid.
From these cases it is clear
that the IDEA was intended to provide both a free and an appropriate
education for disabled children and that the Act should not be read
to provide one of these benefits at the expense of the other. See
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372. This is exactly what the District
is asking us to do in this case. The District would have us read the
IDEA to say, in effect: "If we fail to provide a disabled child with
an appropriate education, the parents must pay for a private education,
or let their child languish in our institution if the only placement
more suitable to her needs and more closely approximating the ideal
envisioned by the IDEA than what we offer is a specialized private
school that admits only learning disabled students."
Congress did not intend
to place beneficiaries of the IDEA in the position of having to choose
only among these unpalatable alternatives.7 Accordingly, we hold that
the failure of the Lawrence School to satisfy the IDEA's mainstreaming
requirement does not bar the Bosses from receiving reimbursement for
expenses associated with sending Sommer to Lawrence for the 1994-95
school year.
IV
Because the Bosses' cross-appeal
of the denial of reimbursement for the 1993-94 school year was time-barred,
the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal of that portion
of the SLRO's ruling. Therefore, we VACATE the district court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of the District as to the 1993-94 school
year. We AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Bosses awarding reimbursement for the 1994-95 school
year.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The IEP stated that
Sommer's progress would be measured in terms of her ability to do
things such as "identify" a "list of sight words . . . with 80% accuracy"
and "improve her reading fluency when reading a passage aloud 8/10
times." Beyond such vague and general statements, the IEP offered
no basis for measuring Sommer's progress.
[2] Apparently, the Bosses
were given the impression that no further amendments would be made
to Sommer's IEP until November of the coming school year. The SLRO
found that this is what the Bosses were told and the record supports
this conclusion.
[3] Section 3323.05(F) provides
that any party who had a due process hearing before an IHO regarding
the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a disabled
child and appeals the IHO's ruling to an SLRO, may appeal "the final
order [of the SLRO] within forty-five days of notification of the
order to the court of common pleas of the county in which the child's
school district of residence is located."
[4] In denying the District's
motion to dismiss the cross-appeal, the district court held that under
Janzen the applicable limitations period was not O.R.C §3323.05(F),
but rather, the four-year time period prescribed by O.R.C. §2305.09
for torts involving trespass, recovery of real property, and fraud.
[5] Apparently, the district
court in this case misconstrued the reasoning in Janzen as to why
we apply the most analogous state statute of limitations to an action
brought under a federal statute with no limitations period. It construed
Janzen as stating that a court should derive the proper statute of
limitations by considering the proper balance between the value of
the policy of repose inherent in a statute of limitations and the
value of enforcing the substantive policies embodied in the statutory
scheme at issue. Janzen, however, expressly endorses the opposite
view that "`[b]y adopting the statute [of limitations] governing an
analogous cause of action under state law, federal law incorporates
the State's judgement on the proper balance between the policies of
repose and the substantive policies of enforcement embodied in the
state cause of action.'" Janzen, 790 F.2d at 489 (quoting Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985)) (emphasis added).
[6] Although our circuit
has noted that the determination of a statute of limitations for IDEA-
related actions must be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into
account the nature of the action, the possible limitations statutes,
and the procedural posture of the case, the relatively short statute
applied in this case is not problematic. As other Circuits have noted,
it is best to promote a speedy resolution of IDEA-related claims,
especially when they have undergone administrative review. Keenan,
82 F.3d at 916-17; Dell v. Board of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053, 1061 (7th
Cir. 1994). Our preference for a longer limitations period in Janzen
was due in large part to the fact that the claim for reimbursement
in that case had not previously been subject to any sort of administrative
review. Janzen, 790 F.2d at 487.
[7] It will commonly be
the case that parents who have not been treated properly under the
IDEA, and who exercise the right of parental placement, will place
their child in a school that specializes in teaching children with
disabilities and thus will not satisfy the mainstreaming requirement
. Adopting such a limitation on parental placements would therefore
effectively vitiate that remedy.
